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CHAPTER 1 4
THE RIGHTS OF WIVES, SONS AND DAUGHTERS IN THE ESTATE 
OF THEIR DECEASED HUSBANDS AND FATHERS
GORDON WOODMAN*
This paper is concerned with legal rights, as the 
term is understood in the legal profession; that is 
with rights which the courts will enforce when they* 
are called upon to do so. In the law of Ghana the 
legal rights of wives, sons and daughters in the estate; 
~f their deceased husbands and fathers are determined 
by two types of law. Firstly, the various systems of 
customary law provide the principles which define these 
rights in the majority of instances. However, secondly, 
customary law has been ousted by statute law in a few 
cases.
Since this paper is concerned with rights 
enforceable in the courts, both types of law must be 
understood in this context. In the case of statute 
law it is perhaps generally accepted that the words of 
a properly enacted statute, as interpreted by the courts, 
constitute law. We may not approve of the enactment; 
we may disobey it; but we agree that it is the law. 
However, in the case of customary law it can be more 
difficult to distinguish what happens in the courts from 
other factors. Investigation shows that there are 
instances where the courts apply certain principles, 
which they call principles of customary law, but which 
do not correspond to the customary practices of the 
people concerned. This seems to happen because of two 
factors. Firstly, courts are not always accurately 
informed about social practices. They have to decide 
cases expeditiously, on the basis of such evidence as 
is put before them; they cannot adopt the more tho­
rough methods of investigation of the anthropologist. 
Secondly, the courts have adopted the practice of 
following their own decisions on points of customary
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law. This has been done largely because justice 
requires that the law be certain, and so predictable. 
However, it results in a tendency for erroneous con­
clusions in particular cases to become embedded in the 
fabric of legal principles. Thus customary-law rights 
as enforced in the courts are not necessarily identical 
with what the anthropologist would f i n d wto be customary- 
law rights. This paper being concerned with rights 
enforced in the courts, its discussion of customary 
law is based on an examination of past judicial 
decisions . 1
While it seems useful to investigate the principles 
enforced by the courts, there is a danger - to which 
the academic lawyer is perhaps peculiarly susceptible - 
of exaggerating their effectiveness. Principles 
enforced by the courts are of course important. When 
a court issues an order, it is enforced by the coer­
cive power of the state, which for practical purposes 
is in the last resort irresistible. Hence the prin­
ciples on which court orders are based might appear 
to be, by their very nature, binding on all members 
of society. However, it must be admitted that there 
is a series of obstacles in the way of enforcing legal 
rights. Firstly, a person with a legal right needs 
to have at least some vague knowledge of the existence 
of his right. Otherwise he will not even contemplate 
enforcing it. Then, if he meets with opposition, he 
must be prepared to go to court; and there may be 
social pressures against this. Frequently, he must 
be able to obtain expert legal advice and representa­
tion in court; otherwise he may be unable to present 
his claim in a manner acceptable to the court. More­
over, he must prove the facts which support his claim, 
and, even when his allegations are true, this is not 
always possible. Finally, even when he has obtained 
a court order, he may find it difficult to enforce it 
against a recalcitrant opponent. Thus although legal 
rights have some effect on society, it cannot be 
assumed that they are invariably determinant factors 
of social behaviour.
Akan customary law and Ewe customary law will be considered in turn. Then there will be a dis­cussion of the legislative provision- the Marriage 
Ordinance - which in a few cases overrides the
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customary law.
Akan Customary Law
Where the deceased husband or father was an Akan. 
and died intestate, the law governing the distribution 
of his estate is usually Akan customary law. The 
courts have assumed, and will probably continue to 
assume, that the various Akan systems of customary law 
are generally identical. They have laid it down in 
innumerable cases that the title to all property which 
was vested in the deceased passes to what they call his 
•'family" .2 t w o problems arise here: the problem of
which property is affected; and the problem of what is 
meant by his "family".
The property affected is that which was vested 
in the deceased as an individual during his lifetime. 
The courts have frequently distinguished this 
"individually-owned" property from "family property". 
Family property in the custody of the deceased is not 
affected by the rule. The principle here is that 
family property is vested in the legal person of the 
family, and that this person does not cease to exist 
on the death of one of its members. Of course-, the 
family will have to appoint someone else to take 
custody of the property, but that is not a matter of 
succession to title.3 Individually-owned property 
includes property acquired by the deceased with the 
assistance of his wives, sons or daughters, such as 
farms cultivated with their help. The courts are not 
normally prepared to hold that this property is owned 
jointly by the man and his wife or child. They 
presume that the wife's or child's contribution was 
given in pursuance of their duty to assist the husband 
or father in his private enterprises, and was not 
intended to benefit the contributor. To rebut this 
presumption requires very clear proof of an agreement 
to acquire a joint title.4
The second problem concerns the word "family”.
The courts mean by this word, when it is used in the 
present context, a matrilineage of which the deceased 
had during his lifetime been a member. This much 
seems well supported by authorities.5 However, it is
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not yet clear who precisely constitutes this lineage: 
whether it consists only of matrilineal descendants 
of his mother, or of matrilineal descendants of his 
maternal grandmother, or of some more remote 
ancestress. It is suggested that for the purpose 
of the present discussion, this further question can 
be left open. It is sufficient to note two consequences 
of the established rules: (a) that the property vests
in a family, which is a group with a corporate 
personality; and (b) that neither widows nor descen­
dants of the deceased are members of this group.
There is some evidence that moveable property 
left by the deceased is normally distributed by the 
''amily to various individuals , including 
widows, sons and daughters of the deceased. However, 
the authorities suggest that they cannot legally com­
pel the family to give them anything, except under a 
principle to be discussed later.7
If the deceased made a wi.l 1 , this may oust the 
rules of intestate succession. It is now established 
that a person who is subject to customary law may 
dispose of his individually-owned property by will.
There was once some doubt about this, because one 
school of lawyers argued that a person should not be 
entitled to defeat the expectations of his family in 
this way. It was finally settled that he could, the 
reason probably being the concern of the courts to 
extend individual rights as against family rights, 
and the influence of common law which has tradition­
ally favoured freedom of testation.® A will may be 
validly made either in customary-law form (by the 
Akan samansiw), or in common-law form (under the 
English Wills Act, 1837, which is part of the law 
of Ghana). A will may, of course, contain dispositions 
in favour of widows, sons and daughters.
These rules give no rights to widows, sons and 
daughters except where the deceased has chosen to 
make a will in their favour. They are still the basic 
law on the subject, but they have been subjected to 
certain qualifications. The law is not entirely 
settled on the scope of these, so it will be necessary 
to give some detail about its development.
The earliest period from which w< have legal
authorities is around the time when John Mensah 
Sarbah published his book Fanti Customary Laws. The 
first edition of this book (which is regarded as 
authoritative by the courts) was published in 1897. 
Sarbah himself, and a number of decisions given at 
this time, held that widows, sons and daughters had 
a right to be provided for life with living accommo­
dation by the family of the deceased. If the 
deceased had left an individually-owned house to the 
family, the widows, sons and daughters were entitled 
to live there, but even if he had lived in a house 
belonging to the family, they had to be given 
accommodation in it. The right was said to be "sub­
ject to good behaviour". The principles were not 
fully discussed in any of the authorities. It is 
possible that in practice accommodation would have 
amounted to maintenance, although this was not said. 
There was no discussion of the training of infant sons 
and daughters.9
For the next sixty years the authorities were 
almost completely silent. There were, however, some 
suggestions that the old right of accommodation was 
merely an aspect of a more general, legally enforce­
able right of maintenance.
The modern developments are embodied in a few 
decisions only, some of which it is necessary to 
cite. Mr. Justice Ollennu gave several decisions 
between 1959 and 1961 dealing with the rights of 
widows. His views are summarised in the following 
passage from his judgment in Yaotey v. Quaye in 1961.
"Now one of the incidents of marriage under 
customary law is that the husband is responsible to 
provide maintenance and accommodation for the wife, 
and after his death that responsibility devolves upon 
his family. Consequently the head of the family is 
bound to provide maintenance for the widow of a 
deceased member of the family during the period of 
the funeral. Thereafter, the family must give the 
widow to a member of the family as his customary 
wife, and that member of the family to whom the 
family assign the widow provides drink to indicate 
his acceptance of the widow. That man need not in 
actual fact live with the widow as his wife, but
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stands in the shoes of the deceased and has to main­
tain the widow as he would a wife married by himself. 
If the family of the deceased fee] that they are 
unable to maintain the widow, they must give her a 
send-off and if the widow does not want to remain the 
responsibility of her husband's family, she would 
take proper steps to determine the relationship. The 
proceedings for the separation of the widow from the 
family of her deceased husband is, in the eyes of the 
customary law, the same as divorce proceedings."
(Although this was a Ga case, it seems clear that the 
judgment was intended to set out principles appli­
cable in Akan law also.)
The rights of sons and daughters had to wait 
until 1963 for further clarification. In that year 
the Supreme Court held in Manu v. K u m a h l 2  that a father had in his lifetime an obligation to maintain 
and train his sons and daughters, and that on his 
death this obligation devolved on the successor, at 
least to the extent of the estate. In that case no 
claim to land was involved, and the court merely 
ordered a sum of money to be paid to the mother of 
the children to reimburse her for expenditure already 
made. In Quaico v. Fosu  ^3 j^ r _ Justice Archer eluci­
dated more fully the principles of the decisions.
The action in that case was brought by the successor 
of an Akan man against his widows for a declaration 
of the nature and extent of the interests in the 
estate of the defendants, their children by the de­
ceased, and the family. The court gave the following 
declaration:
"(1) That the defendants and their children have an 
interest in the estate of /“the deceased_7\
"(2) (a) The defendants as widows have a right of
residence during widowhood in any house built on 
land self-acquired by the deceased or to dwell 
on any land acquired by the deceased.
(b) The children and their issue have also a 
right to occupy as a residence any house built 
on land self-acquired by the deceased during 
their life-time subject to good behaviour.
(c) The interest of the widows and the children 
is equivalent to a determinable life tenancy
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which entitles them to a share of the income 
accruing from the houses in which they are 
entitled to reside.
(d) The widows and children are entitled to be 
maintained by the Head of Family or successor 
by the payment of adequate allowance to the 
widows during their widowhood and also to the 
children until they are capable of maintaining 
themselves. These payments may be periodical 
or amount to annuities.
"(3) By Akan customary law, the self-acquired property 
of the deceased has become family property on his 
death intestate and the maternal family have beco­
me the successors to the estate subject to the 
life interest of the deceased*s children and the 
occupational rights of the widows during their 
widowhood in the houses built by the deceased on 
self-acquired land.
"(4) Since it seems that the widows and the children 
have an interest not only in the immovable pro­
perty but have to be maintained as of right from 
the whole estate, they are akin to beneficiaries 
who derive some advantages or benefit from the 
whole estate. Their interest and rights to 
maintenance are subject to the life interest of 
each member of the maternal family in the whole 
estate vested in the successor. If that is the 
case, their interests are inextricably mixed up 
in the indivisible estate and accordingly they 
are entitled to shares in the estate if ultimate­
ly the whole estate is converted into money or 
partitioned. The widows and children do not 
inherit but they claim interests from the inhe­
ritors, that is, the maternal family through the 
head of family or the successor."14
The law seems here to be at an early stage in the 
development of important new principles. The follow­
ing questions appear to be still unclear: (a) Can a
right of accommodation be enforced in respect of pro­
perty which was family property in the lifetime of the 
deceased? Some of the cases give such a right. How­
ever, in Manu v. Kuma it was suggested that the r i g h t  
of maintenance might be restricted to the value of the 
estate, and in Quaico v. Fosu the right of accommoda­
tion was restricted to land self-acquired by the
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deceased. The clear modern distinction between 
property of a family and property of a member may 
lead to a negative answer to this question. (b) Is 
the consent of the widows and children required for 
a valid sale of property in which they might other­
wise be accommodated? The tendency in Quaico v.
Fosu to regard the right as being easily convertible 
into financial support suggests a negative answer.
(c) If this property is sold, how are the shares of 
the widows and children in the sale price calculated? 
This raises the question: whether the claims of the
widows and children of a male member should be 
weighed against the claims of family members. (d) In 
cases of disagreement, who is entitled to decide that 
the right to accommodation shall be commuted to 
money payment?\ If the money payment is regarded 
as being equally good, either side might have this 
right. (e) Is the children’s right enjoyed for life 
or until maturity? The modern cases suggest that the 
right is to be maintained only until the son or 
daughter has been adequately prepared to maintain him­
self, although the right of residence was held in 
Quaico v. Fosu to be for life. (f) What precisely 
are the rights of the parties if a widow decides to 
leave her husband’s family, or if the family decides 
not to keep her? The decision in Quaico v. Fosu 
suggests that she has vested rights which might be 
voluntarily abandoned by her, but could not be 
unilaterally reduced in value by the family.
Finally, it is unclear how far the law of wills 
is affected by these recent developments. It was 
mentioned earlier that a testator is today free to 
defeat the expectations of his family. Is he equally 
free to defeat the expectations of his wives, sons 
and daughters? It is arguable that he is not, on two 
grounds. Firstly, the trend of judicial development 
in this century has been towards reducing the incidence 
of family property, but increasing the rights of wives, 
sons and daughters. It is consistent with this to 
argue that today a will can defeat the expectations of 
a family, but not those of widows, sons and daughters. 
Secondly, the rights of widows, sons and daughters are 
said to be based on a continuation after a man’s death 
of legal obligations which he owed then during his
lifetime . Since he could not have denied their 
rights while alive, he should not be allowed to do 
so at his death. However, this question has not 
yet come before the courts.
Ewe Customary Law
On the death intestate of an Ewe mam, the 
applicable law is normally Ewe customary law. How­
ever, there are not yet enough reported judicial 
decisions for one to extract clearly established 
principles on many questions in this System. It 
is sometimes suggested that Ewe law applies 
exactly the same principles as the Akan law, with 
the one basic difference that patrilineal relation­
ships are relevant instead of matrilineal rela­
tionships.-^ On that view, a man’s individual 
property would pass on his death intestate to his 
family, a term which in this case would mean a 
patrilineage to which he had belonged during his 
lifetime. However, the decisions in particular 
cases do not prove these generalisations.
There is a comparatively large volume of 
authority on Anlo law. This establishes that a man's 
property passes on his deaith intestate to a group 
consisting of his sons and daughters. The courts 
consider that all children, both sons and daughters, 
are entitled to exactly equal interests.I7 For other 
Ewe groups there are few authorities. In most cases 
only one decision gives any guidance for each group. 
These cases are generally consistent with Anlo prin­
ciples, but may be insufficient to establish that 
these principles apply in their entirety to each 
group. Other sources, such as the writings of 
anthropologists, may perhaps indicate the customary 
practices, and it could be argued that they might 
provide evidence of what would be proved to and 
eventually accepted by the courts as the customary 
law. However, little has been written about these 
practices, apart from those of the Anlo. Moreover, 
for reasons already given, it does not seem safe to 
assume that what the anthropologists find to be the 
customary law will coincide with what the courts 
will hold to be the law.
Thus it is probable that a man's sons and 
daughters belong to the group which inherits his
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property, and possibly that they alone constitute 
it. The discussion by the courts of widows* rights 
in Akan cases has implied that the same principles 
apply throughout Ghana, but there have been no 
reported Ewe cases to confirm this. There is no 
authority indicating clearly a person*s powers of 
testamentary disposition in Ewe customary law.
Statute Law
'the principles of customary law are subject 
to legislative amendment or abolition. It is 
therefore necessary to examine the effect of the 
relevant statute in force today. This is the 
Marriage Ordinance, which was first enacted in 1884. 
The policy of the ordinance is to provide a legally 
monogamous form of marriage for those who wish to 
make use of it, as an alternative to marriage under 
a system of customary law. This option has not in 
fact been used in a large proportion of cases. 
According to the I960 census fewer than 4.1% of 
marriages of Akan people were ordinance marriages, 
and fewer than 3.6% of marriages of Ewe.*8 When 
the statute was enacted it was considered that 
succession was intimately connected with marriage, 
so that a new form of marriage required a new form 
of succession.
Section 48 of the Marriage Ordinance, which deals 
with succession, is set out in full in an appendix to 
this paper. It is sufficient now to summarise its 
provisions. There are two alternative conditions for 
its application. Firstly, it applies if the deceased 
was subject to customary law, married under the 
ordinance, and died intestate survived by a widow or 
issue of the ordinance marriage. It is assumed by 
the courts that virtually all Ghanaians are subject 
to customary law. The requirement of survival by a 
widow or issue of the ordinance marriage seems to be 
a requirement that some person closely connected with 
the ordinance marriage be still alive. The effect 
is that, if a man marries under the ordinance at some 
time in his life, he is affected by the ordinance so 
iong as the wife or any issue of the ordinance 
marriage survives, but no longer. Secondly, section 
48 applies if the deceased was the issue of an
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ordinance marriage, and dies intestate. "Issue" 
generally means descendant to any degree, but it 
may be restricted here to descendants in the first 
generation. Presumably this provision is based on 
.the assumption that the issue of an ordinance 
marriage will grow up in an environment which will 
lead him to prefer the new type of succession to 
that of customary law.. .
Once it is clear that section 48 of the 
ordinance applies, its effect must be considered. 
The rules are complicated, but hhre it is necessary 
to consider only the rights of widows, sons and 
daughters of the deceased. Section 48 provides 
firstly that one-third of the property passes under 
the appropriate customary law, and that the remain­
ing two-thirds pass under certain rules once appli­
cable in England. These English rules have the 
effect of giving four-ninths of the estate to the 
children or other issue of the deceased in equal 
shares, and the remaiLning two-n'inths to the widow. 
If there is no widow, the issue also take the share 
which she would have had. If there are no issue, 
the widow takes one-third instead of two-ninths, 
and the remaining one-third passes to more remote 
relat ives.
It may be noted that widows and children who 
benefit under these provisions have rights of a 
different type from those of widows and children in 
Akan customary law. Under the ordinance they take 
proportions of the estate. To use the language of 
Mr. Justice Archer in Quaico v. Fosu, they do not 
merely claim interests from the inheritors; they are 
themselves in the class of inheritors.
The application o f  these rules has r e q u i r e d  a 
clarification o f  the meaning o f  the terms " w i f e "  and 
"issue". Here the courts have changed their o p i n i o n  
in modern times. The view originally adopted was 
that only a wife or issue of an ordinance m a r r i a g e  
could benefit from the provisions. Hence i f ,  for 
example, a man was survived by a number o f  c h i l d r e n  
o f  an ordinance marriage, and a number o f  o t h e r  
children, only the "ordinance" children w o u l d  beneii
279
However, in 1959 the Court of Appeal laid it down in 
Coleman v. Shang^9 that the provisions could benefit 
any wife whose marriage was recognised by the law of 
Ghana, whether by customary law or the Ordinance, and 
any issue who was legitimate under any of the systems 
of law in force in Ghana. The technical argument for 
this change can be briefly stated. The ordinance 
distinguishes ordinance wives and issue from other 
wives and issue for the purpose of setting a condition 
precedent to the operation of section 48. It says 
that the deceased must be survived by the wife or 
issue of the ordinance marriage (or must himself 
be the issue of such a marriage) if section 48 is to 
apply. But it does not apply this distinction to 
beneficiaries under the section. Once it is establi­
shed that section 48 applies, it is quite possible 
for it to be applied to benefit persons other than 
an ordinance wife or issue. The social policy behind 
the change in the law was probably an opposition to 
treatment of a man’s customary-law wives and children 
less favourable than the same man’s ordinance wives 
and children.
The case of Coleman v. Shang nrovides an example 
of the new application. The deceased man in that case 
had married three women in succession. First he 
married a wife by customary law, and had children by 
her. Subsequently this marriage was terminated, he 
married another woman under the ordinance, and had 
children by her. The ordinance marriage ended with 
the death of the wife; he then married a third woman 
by customary law, but he had no more children. When 
he died intestate, he was survived by one of the 
children of the ordinance marriage. Consequently, 
the court held, section 48 was to be applied, the 
necessary condition precedent having been satisfied. 
However, the provisions operated not only to the 
benefit of the child by the ordinance marriage, but 
also to the benefit of his surviving customary-law 
wife and of his children by the first, customary-law 
marriage. The only children who did not benefit were 
certain children born to him during the subsistence 
of his second, ordinance marriage, by someone other 
than his ordinance wife. They were necessarily ille­
gitimate, because to recognise them would infringe 
the monogamous nature of the ordinance marriage.
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(In fact their' mother was the woman who eventually 
became his third wife, but their illegitimate status 
could not be remedied by the subsequent marriage.)
It is worth mentioning a somewhat unexpected 
result of this reasoning. It means that a customary- 
law wife, or the child of a customary-law marriage, 
may be entitled to a portion of a mah’s estate, not 
because of any provisions of customary law, but 
because the man once married someone else under the 
ordinance, and is survived by issue of that ordinance 
marriage.
A few more observations may be made on the ordi­
nance. It has been seen that the modern Akan law 
confers a right of maintenance on wives and children. 
It was suggested that perhaps this right could not be 
defeated by a will made by the deceased. However, 
this possibility affects the Marriage Ordinance. 
Section 48 is stated to apply to property of which the 
deceased could have disposed by will. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the rights of maintenance of 
widows and children must first be met, and that 
section 48 will then operate only cn what is left. 
However, this argument would produce strange results. 
The right of maintenance is enjoyed only by customary- 
law wives, not by ordinance wives, because the rights 
of the latter as against their husbands depend on 
common law or English law, which do not give a wife 
a right of maintenance after her husband's death. On 
similar grounds, it is not certain that the children 
of an ordinance marriage could claim maintenance 
under customary law. Thus there would be a distinc­
tion drawn to the detriment of ordinance wives and 
children. Moreover, it could be argued that, since 
section 48 gives shares in the estate to widows and 
children, there is no necessity to give priority to 
their customary-law rights of maintenance: the 
ordinance protects them adequately.
Further questions arise in respect of the one- 
third of the estate which passes under customary law. 
If the Ewe customary law would give an entire estate 
to the sons and daughters, then in the case of a 
deceased Ewe to whose estate section 48 applies, this 
one-third will pass to the sons and daughters. How­
ever, it is very unlikely that Ewe customary law
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recognises even the restricted type of illegitimacy 
which applies under the ordinance. Thus a chi 3d 
excluded by illegitimacy from a share in the two- 
thirds passing under English law, may still have his 
share in the one-third which passes under customary 
law 20.
It appears that the possible rights of widows in 
Ewe law, and the rights of widows, sons and daughters 
in Akan law, are rights of maintenance and training.
It is possible for customary-1aw wives, and children 
whose rights are governed by customary law, to claim 
rights of maintenance out of this one-third? If they 
can, these claims may in some cases absorb the entire 
one-third. Or can they merely claim one-third of the 
maintenance to which they would have been entitled if 
customary law had governed the whole estate? Or 
should it be argued that, as they take shares of the 
two-thirds which pass under the English law, these 
shares are intended to be adequate for them, and they 
cannot claim any more for their maintenance? If 
section 48 remains on the statute book much longer, 
these questions may have to be answered by the courts, 
but it seems impossible to predict the answers.
* * ** * *
Appendix: Text of the Marriage Ordinance (Cap.127,
Laws of the Gold Coast, 1951 ed.) , Section 48
Where any person who is subject to native law 
or custom contracts a marriage whether within or 
without the Colony in accordance with the provisions 
of this Ordinance or of any other enactment relating 
to marriage, or has contracted a marriage prior to 
the passing of this Ordinance which marriage is 
validated hereby, and such person dies intestate on 
or after the 15th day of February, 1909, leaving a 
widow or husband or any issue of such marriage;
And also where any person who is issue of any 
such marriage dies intestate on or after the said 
15th day of February, 1909, the personal property of 
such intestate, and also any real property of which 
the said intestate might have disposed by will shall 
be distributed or descend in manner following, viz:
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Two-thirds in accordance with the provisions of 
the law of England relating to the distribution of 
personal estates of intestates in force on the 19th 
day of November, 1884, any native law or custom to 
the contrary notwithstanding; and one-third in 
accordance with the provisions of the native customary 
law which would have obtained if such person had not 
been married under this Ordinance.
Provided:
(i) That where by the law of England, any portion 
of the estate of such intestate would become 
a portion of the casual hereditary revenues 
of the Crown such portion shall be distribu­
ted in accordance with th^ provisions of the 
native customary law, and shall not become a 
portion of the said casual hereditary 
revenue;
(ii) That real property, the succession to which 
cannot by the native customary law be affec­
ted by testamentary disposition shall des­
cend in accordance with the provisions of 
such native customary law, anything herein 
to the contrary notwithstanding.
*  * *  *
1. This point is argued more fully in "Some Realism 
About Customary Law - the West African Experience” 
(1969) Wisconsin Law Review 128.
2. Support for this proposition may be found in the 
cases cited in note 5 below.
3. Villars v. Baffoe (1909) Ren. 549.
4. On property acquired with the help of a wife, see: 
Manu v. Mensah (1953) D.C. (Land) '52-'55 , 156;
Quartey v. Martey/“195(2_/G.L.R . 377; Adorn v. Kwarley 
/1962J/. G.L.R. 112; Clerk v. Clerk (1968) C.C. 99; 
Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws (2nd and 3rd edd.), p.63; 
Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs, p. 208. On property, 
acquired with the help of a son or daughter,see: Kosia 
v. Nimo (1950) D.C. (Land) »48-»51, 239;
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Okwabi v. Adonu (1957) 2 W.A.C.A. 288; Adjabeng v.
Kwabla /_ 1960_7 G.L.R. 37; Adorn v. Kwai lev; above;
Sarbah, o p . ci t ., p p .60, 63; Ollennu, Principles 
of Customary Land Law in Ghana (hereafter referred 
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